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ABSTRACT
This article applies to the interpretation of the intent of
products.
doctrine terminates the use rights of the patent holder. However,
if the sale is conditioned on some use limitations, violators of those terms are liable for
infringement. The courts, suggested in Mitchell v. Hawley (1872) and formalized in Mallinckrodt v.
Medipart (1992), have allowed use restrictions based on license terms. Restrictions are disallowed
under the affirmative defense of patent invalidity, such as from an antitrust violation.
This article is concerned with use restrictions based on the claimed legitimate business purpose of
Two particular cases are evaluated, the lease-only terms for rotary
oil drills and single-use laser toner cartridges under the recent Lexmark cases. In both cases, the
lease-based restrictions on repair is justified as needed for protecting and/or enhancing the quality
and reputation of the products, justifications accepted by the respective appeals courts. The
evaluations presented here argue that, while the stated justifications are legitimate, there are less
restrictive approaches to achieving those goals, and further that the courts by unquestionably
It is further argued that the patents as licensed are invalid, and hence the terms unenforceable, as
they violate antitrust law by using the licenses to illegally extend the scope of the patent rights. The
statute is Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914), which allows more anticipatory
latitude than the monopolization clause (Section II) of the Sherman Act (1890), the only applicable
statute.
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THE COURTS INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS PURPOSES ,
WITH APPLICATIONS TO LEXMARK
W. LESSER*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
The courts are frequently called upon to ascertain intent. Intent is a mental state
requiring the courts in their assessments to look for external ramifications of that
state, often conduct which can be interpreted as revealing a mental set. Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act1 for example,
monopolize, actions which embody the intent to monopolize, as distinct from achieving
a monopoly position due to a superior product or technology. 2 In accordance with
interpretations of the infringement clauses of the Patent Act, courts can treble
her than unintentional.3
This current article is focused on one dimension of deducing intent, that
conditions for patented products. In particular, consider the evaluations of the courts
in determining if a questioned business practice is on balance justifiable or not, and
hence whether the intent of the behavior is legitimate, and legal, or illegitimate, and
illegal. Specifically, the courts all too frequently do not consider whether the
motivation for an ostensibly legitimate business practice to, say, protect the reputation
of the patent holder is rather predominately a means of limiting competition from
repairers of those products.
A case indicative of the considerations of the courts in deciding on the legitimacy
of a business practice is Dehydrating Process Company v. A. O. Smith Corporation,4 a
private action under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 5 The defendant manufactured and
sold storage silos and unloaders, separately patented. Initially, the unloaders were
sold independently, but as the result of 50 percent dissatisfaction of customers over a
seven year period leading to multiple refunds, Smith adopted the policy of refusing to
sell its unloaders except in conjunction with its specialized silos. The reverse policy,

* W. Lesser 2017. W. Lesser is the Susan E. Lynch Professor in Science and Business in the
Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell University.
1 15 U.S.C. Section 2.
2 Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Comf
The
conduct of a single firm, governed by 15 U.S.C. § 2, is unlawful only when it threatens actual
monopolization. That is, a monopoly in and of itself is not unlawful. Monopolization requires a showing
of (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
3 Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016)
The sort of
conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously described in cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful,
flagrant, or indeed
4 Dehydrating Process Company v. A. O. Smith Corporation, 292 F.2d 653 (First Circuit Court
Appeal, 1961), cert. denied.
5 § 4 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (Suits by persons injured).

[16:411 2017] The Courts Interpretations of Legitimate Business Purposes ,
with Applications to Lexmark

413

that silos could only be purchased in conjunction with its unloaders, was never
instituted.6
The case hinged in part on whether the silo and unloader were a single or multiple
products. Quoting United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
[I]t is
equally clear that one cannot circumvent the anti-trust laws simply by claiming that
he is selling a single product. The facts must be examined to ascertain whether or not
there are legitimate reasons for selling normally separate items in a combined form to
7
dispel any inferences that it is really a disguised tierecognized by the district court in Jerrold, that a proper business reason may justify
8
what might otherwise be an unlawful tieplaintiff that the compulsory joining of two 'separate' articles is a per se violation of
the [Clayton] act. This statement, however, solves nothing. Articles, though physically
distinct, may be related through circumstances. The sound business interests of the
seller or, phrasing it another way, a substantial hardship apart from the loss of the tie9
in sale may be such
From A.O. Smith
of defendant's conduct, but a private action in which the plaintiff seeks, and must
10
eet
defendant's specifications with respect to its storage containers. Since this
requirement has been demonstrated to be reasonable, plaintiff has suffered no
11 That is, since the court determined the tying arrangement, while
a per se violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act 12, was reasonable, a legitimate act by
the silo manufacturer to protect its product reputation and satisfy its customers, there
was no loss and no guilt by the defendant. Had the practice been found to be
unreasonable then presumably the decision would have gone the other way.
Below, consider two example cases where the restrictive sales arrangements for
patented products can be interpreted as principally intended to limit competition and
hence are, I argue, illegal, even if there is a component of a legitimate business purpose
involved. Generally, I propose in matters of the conditional sale of patented products
the courts should be more assiduous in considering the underlying intent of the
restrictive sales conditions, and whether the same purpose could be achieved in a less
necessity. One of the two case examples is the ongoing Lexmark Int., Inc. v. Impression
Products, Inc.13 suit in its most current iteration over refilled printer toner cartridges
implications.
The applicable case law extends quite broadly to incorporate aspects of repair vs.
reconditioning of patented products as well as patent misuse and antitrust, among
See A.O. Smith, 292 F.2d at 654, 656, n. 1.
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (D.C.E.D.Pa.1960) (emphasis
added).
8 See A.O. Smith, 292 F.2d at 655.
9 See id.
10 See id.at 657.
11 See id.at 657 (emphasis added).
12 § 3 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (Exclusive dealing and tying arrangements).
13 Lexmark Int., Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016 en banc)
(hereinafter Lexmark).
6
7
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other topics.14 To keep the analysis more tractable, only the domestic aspects are
dimension of Lexmark. The focus on the domestic dimensions also frees the analysis
from considering the connectedness between patent and copyright law which has been
a controversial component of the Lexmark decision.15
This paper is organized as follows. Following (Section II) I develop a damage
model and then describe in some detail the two case examples, rotary drills and printer
cartridges (Section III). Next (Section IV) is the case history review leading to the
assessment (Section V) of how the courts are overly solicitous of business justifications
for restrictive conditional sales agreements which could be curtailed, particularly
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 16 Section VI draws this
conclusion in a broader context.
II. DAMAGE MODEL
Consumers are hypothesized to be damaged by higher prices attributable to the
conditional sale of patented products following a marketing plan which has come to be
-andUnder that model, a firm sells a product for a low price, possibly below cost, in order
to generate sales of an integral complementary product or service at a higher price. 17
As the name implies, the model follows the alleged marketing plan for safety
razors under which the razor was sold at or below cost with profits made from the
ongoing sale of blades. Reference is to King Gillette,
1904,18 constituting a reusable specialized handle designed to position disposable thin
metal blades, which could be inexpensively stamped from sheet metal. This device
dangerous to use while requiring daily sharpening.
There is some debate over whether Gillette truly pioneered this marketing
strategy, or whether it was introduced by a competitor. 19 What is significant is that

See infra Section IV.
In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Ink Technologies Printer Supplies, LLC, (9 F. Supp. 3d 830
(S. Dist. Ohio, 2014)), the district court decided, referencing the recent Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. (133 S. Ct. 1351 (2012)), a copyright case ruling that a first authorized sale anywhere in the
world exhausted the copyright, that the Court did not necessarily intend to apply copyright law to
patent law. That ruling meant that Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int. Trade. Comm., 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)), which decided for the first sale doctrine to apply the sale must have occurred under the
U.S. patent i.e., in the United States, remained good law and so denied the dismissal of the case.
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc. (816 F.3d 721, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2016)) affirmed
that decision. Lexmark had previously been granted an exclusionary order against imports of its
toners by the International Trade Commission (U.S. Int. Trade Comm., In the Matter of Certain Toner
Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-740 Sept. 27, 2011).
16 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
17 Moneyterms Razor-blade model, available at http://moneyterms.co.uk/razor-blade-model/.
Last visited 9/8/16.
18 U.S. patents Nos. 775, 134 and 775,135, both issued Nov. 15, 1904.
19 Randall C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s). Law School Univ. Chicago Sept. 2010 at
19 and 23.
14
15
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Gillette and competitors did engineer their razors so as to prevent the
interchangeability of blades, as needed to make the model profitable.
From a more theoretical perspective, the razor blade model depends on the
elasticities of demand
for the underlying
product and its complements. If consumers are price sensitive, then a low underlying
price may be required to induce them to try a new product like a safety razor. 20 Indeed
that is what Gillette observed in 1921 when a lower price sharply increased sales of
the older handle and blade package (see above). Lowering the price of the base product
also lessons the risk shoppers take with the purchase of an expensive product which
might prove to be unsatisfactory. Users of the razor blade model also benefit from
consumers who are motivated by the low entry price but may not consider the (high)
ongoing cost of complements.
The model remains widely used today, certainly for razors. In a recent article,
Malcolm Harris recounts being sent unsolicited a free Gillette Fusion razer. Once the
included five blade cartridges were dulled he was shocked to learn the price of
replacement blades, calculating a lifetime cost of $22,000. Instead he purchased online
a Merkur Safety Razor for $33, which has an estimated lifetime replacement blade cost
of $ 400.21 The model is applied as well for cell phones (subsidized handsets in
exchange for a multi-year service contract), e-readers like the Kindle (subsidized
reader limiting e-book purchases to Amazon), Barbie dolls (inexpensive doll for which
multiple outfits and accessories are available), and computer printers (low priced
printers with high-margin cartridges).22 Conceptually, the model works only if there
is a specific means of binding sales of the base product (the razor) with ongoing sales
of the complementary products. Sellers strive to limit competition in the complements
market by, for example, restricting cell phones to work only with a single network
provider, or disabling a printer when a third-party cartridge is used.
As these examples suggest, generally some means of connecting the base and
contingent product purchases is needed. Otherwise competitors can benefit from the
installed capacity of more base products sold at low prices and sell their own
complementary products. For purposes here, that connecting requirement is identified
as restrictive conditions on the post-sale use of a patented product. Those restrictions
limit sales by third parties for the complements, reducing competition and raising the
potential to elevate price. Two case examples of the alleged use of conditional sales
agreements for patented products allowing the razor blade model tie-in sales are
summarized in the following Section III and the case histories of the treatment of
conditional sales of patented products and ancillary matters are laid out in Section IV.

20 Craig Zawada, Razor-and-Blades Pricing Strategies In the Digital Age, FORBES, Dec. 19, 2012,
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/12/19/razor-and-blades-pricing-strategies-inthe-digital-age/#5baf11ed5a42. Last visited 9/8/16.
21 Malcolm Harris, Safety Razors, NY TIMES, Aug. 28, 2016, at 24, 26.
22 Moneyterms, Razor-blade model, available at http://moneyterms.co.uk/razor-blade-model/.
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III. CASE EXAMPLES
A. Rotary Drills
These cases have to do with patented rotary drill bits for oil exploration, more
specifically the roller rock bit industry. By the end of the 1930s the Hughes Tool
Company dominated the market with 70+ percent of the sales. 23 By providing a
superior, longer-lasting bit, the share was generated by a longer-lasting bit, something
of particular relevance in the sector, as replacing the bit requires withdrawing and
disconnecting the thousands of feet of pipe constituting the drill shaft. The process
can take all day at 10,000 feet.24 When retrieved, the bits consisting of bearings and
cutter teeth are typically completely worn out. The exception is 12 15 percent of bits
for which the bearings are still functional, making then appropriate for re-tipping,25
and therein lies the basis of the infringement and contract violation suits. 26
In 1934, the Hughes Tool Co. formalized the practice of leasing rather than selling
its bits, a practice previously employed by competitor firms. 27 The lease contract
bits were delivered as specified by the following lease provision:
When the original cutter teeth and/or bearings have served their useful life,
the user will surrender the bits to Hughes Tool Company upon request. In
accepting delivery, the user agrees not to surrender any of the tools as
mentioned above to other than a duly authorized representative' of Hughes.
Each bit is stamped with the words, 'Property of Hughes Tool co.28
The Hughes field representatives collected the used bits, returning them to the
field station where they were analyzed for needed design improvements, or for
identifying an enhanced choice of bits for the drilling conditions experienced by a
particular customer.29
These facts went undisputed between the district and appeals court, but
subsequent evidence, interpreted differently, led to completely diverse decisions, with
the appeals court finding for infringement by concluding no patent invalidity in the
absence of an antitrust violation,30 while the district court ruled the subject patents
unenforceable as a consequence of an antitrust violation and hence no damages owed.31
In part, the decisions hinged on whether Hughes did indeed collect and examine all
23 Hughes Tool Co. v. Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525, 542 (District Ct. Southern Dist. Oklahoma 1953)
(hereinafter Ford).
24 D.B. Cole v. Hughes Tool Company, 215 F.2d 924, 927 (Ct. Appeals Tenth Cir. 1954)
(hereinafter Hughes) (The case is a compilation of three separate cases brought against re-tippers,
heard jointly but decided separately. Id. at 926).
25 See id. at 928.
26 See id. at 926.
27 See id. at 928.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 942.
31 See Ford, 114 F. Supp. at 556, 558 (concluding that Hughes Tool Co., was in violation of Section
2 of the Sherman Act, monopolization).
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the spent bits. The appeals court determined it did so. The field representatives were
said to have maintained records of every drill bit by serial number, and on examination
if further input was needed the bits were forwarded to field stations or the Houston
research lab.32
t field
division points, and in the research laboratory, in the light of the record of each
particular bit, that the manufacturer can eliminate flaws, design improvements in the
33 From this perspective, the leasing
arrangement was essential to the Hughes business model of recovering and examining
used bits in a process of constantly-improved product. In short, it served a legitimate
business purpose.
The district court interpreted this collection and examination process quite
differently, based in part on testimony from plaintiff and defendant executives, as well
determined to retain control over the bits for the purpose of preventing rebuilding of
the bits, as distinguished from a mere policy to get them back. The reason for this
action was to control the drill bits to prevent them from being repaired and entered
into competition with new bits, rather than to protect th
34 Hughes chose to sue the re-tippers for
infringement rather than the lessees, its customers. 35 The court supported that
testimony with the additional information that only the smaller, independent retippers were sued by Hughes while the larger firms which re-tipped the bits leased
from Hughes were never threatened even though their actions were well known. That
the court took as evidence the true intent of the lease agreements was to curtail
competition and not the stated one of investigation and research. 36
From the perspective of this article, it is accepted that research on worn drill bits
in itself constitutes a legitimate business purpose. At issue is whether the leasing
requirement intended primarily to a legitimate business purpose, and hence itself a
legitimate business practice, or whether the underlying purpose of leasing exclusively
was to restrict competition from re-tippers. The interpretation of the ancillary
information led one court to determine the intended use of the lease arrangements to
foster and extend its patent-based monopoly. One such bit of ancillary information
was testimony from one lessee that collecting the worn bits did not require a formal
37 The superior court took a more
lease arrangement
business-oriented view of the needs for the lease requirement and exonerated the firm.
Both cases illustrate the pivotal interpretation of intent, in the context of the minimal
restrictive practices needed to achieve the stated business purpose.

See Hughes, 215 F.2d at 928.
See id. at 929.
34 See Ford, 114 F. Supp. at 547 (footnotes omitted) (This testimony came from a former sales
executive who was also a lawyer directly involved with drafting the lease agreements. The Hughes
court at 930 dismissed this testimony as hearsay as well as a violation of the lawyer-client privilege.
The Ford court (114 F. Supp. at n. 87) discounted the hearsay aspect as the witness was directly
involved in the development of the agreement while arguing that its creation was undertaken in his
capacity of a marketing specialist and not a lawyer).
35 See Hughes, 215 F.2d at 935.
36 See Ford, 114 F. Supp. at 549-51.
37 See id. at n. 88.
32
33
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B. Printer Cartridges
The focus here is on Lexmark International, a producer of computer printers and
cartridges.38 The cases they went through multiple rounds since 2005 39 along with a
writ of certiorari filed March 2016 40 apply to control over toner cartridges for laser
printers. Lexmark followed a two-tiered pricing strategy, the higher priced of which,
purchaser to use the spent cartridge as he/she chose, including having it refilled. The
second price arrangement, at a 20 percent discoun
Return
41 involved a license agreement whereby the cartridge
user agreed to return the empty unit to Lexmark for disposal or refilling.
The Lexmark Collection and Recycling Program 42 involves users returning empty
cartridges to Lexmark for reuse and recycling, described as a life cycle system,
sustainable and showing environmental stewardship. Genuine Lexmark cartridges
-brand
cartridges. A site is available for checking on the genuineness of a cartridge by
entering numbers contained on the box and cartridge. The sale of patent and
trademark-infringing products is noted as damaging the Lexmark brand.
referred to as box or shrink wrap licenses, is printed on the cartridge box and provided
online, reading as follows:43
Lexmark Return Program Cartridges are sold at a discount versus the prices
of regular cartridges in exchange for the customer's agreement to use the
cartridge only once and return it only to Lexmark for remanufacturing or
recycling. Regular cartridges without this license/agreement sold at regular
prices are also available. Regular cartridges are also recyclable at no cost
through Lexmark Cartridge Collection Program.
During the trial the issue of adequately informing buyers and resellers was
undisputed.44 Lexmark further acts to prevent illegal refilling by incorporating a chip
effectively emptied, disables the cartridge from function if illegally refilled. 45 Chips
are copyrighted and the cartridges patented. Cartridges designated for non-domestic
38 Only the domestic components of the case are considered here.
For an outline of the
international dimensions see supra note 13.
39 Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass Inc. v. Lexmark Int., Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2005) (affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer).
40 Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., Docket No, 15-1189, Mar. 21, 2016.
Available
at
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/impression-products-inc-v-lexmarkinternational-inc/. Last visited 8/12/16.
41 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 727-28.
42 Lexmark
Collection
and
Recycling
Program.
Available
at
http://www.lexmark.com/en_us/products/supplies-and-accessories/collection-and-recyclingprogram.html. Last visited 8/11/16.
43 Available
at https://www.cdw.com/shop/products/Lexmark-Return-Program-64015HA-HiYield-Black-Toner-Cartridge/808831.aspx. Last visited 8/12/16.
44 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 728.
45 See id.
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use do not function on domestic market printers, and vice versa. 46 Lexmark sells
cartridges both directly to end users and through re-sellers.47
Despite these efforts, some of the Return Program cartridges find their way to
third party re-fillers who sell them back to consumers at a considerable discount to the
Lexmark-authorized products. At the time of writing, one example firm offered
remanufactured black toner cartridges with a 6,000 page yield for $49 while a Lexmark
Return Program cartridge with a 2,500 page capacity was priced at $ 107. 48 The refillers modify the chip to circumvent the disabling of the cartridges. 49
fillers for patent infringement, could sue its customers for contract breaches, or seek
redress under Trademark law.50 Lexmark sued for infringement, with Impression
Products the remaining dominant defendant.51 Impression Products is a small, family52

its Return Cartridges constituted patent misuse constituted an antitrust violation or
,
sole
defense relied on the interpretation Mallinckrodt, 53 which applies to a post-sale use
restriction as does Lexmark,54 no longer constituted good law.55
For early rounds of this case as applied to patent law (other aspects were
adjudicated under California competition and contract law), the district court
determined that Lexmark imposed an enforceable condition on the Prebate (later
called Return Cartridge) printer cartridges because Lexmark had yet to exhaust their
patent rights.56 The case subsequently proceeded to Kentucky where the district court
Static Control

46
42 or Cartridge Region Mismatch error indicates that the installed toner cartridge is
manufactured for a different geographic region than the printer. The printers and the toner
cartridges each have a certain geographical code tagged to them, much like the coding on DVD players
and DVDs. Both must be coded to the same geography in order for them to work together. If you
install a toner cartridge that does not match the region of the printer, the printer will
post a Cartridge Region Mismatch error. Regionalization also helps to protect users from
counterfeit products, and to protect authorized dealers and distributors of Lexmark products from
Available
at
http://support.lexmark.com/index?pmv=print&page=content&productCode=LEXMARK_T642&segm
ent=SUPPORTproductCode%3D&viewlocale=en_US&searchid=1285271200064&actp=search&userl
ocale=EN_ZA&id=SO3581. Last visited 8/12/16 (emphasis in original).
47 See Lexmark 816 F.3d at 728.
48 Available
at
http://www.ldproducts.com/Lexmark/Laser-Toner/E-Series/E234n/5171Printer.html. Last visited June 28, 2016.
49 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 728.
50

-O, Apr. 21, 2015 at 13. Available at
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/04/cartridges-exhaustion-clarify.html. Last visited 8/12/16.
51 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 729.
52 Impression Products, available at http://www.impressionproductsinc.com/. Last visited
8/12/16.
53 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (overruling or significantly
limiting precedent affirming the patent exhaustion doctrine).
54 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d.
55 See id. at 729.
56 See Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass., 421 F.3d 981.
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ruling in Quanta,57
Static Control
Patent holders may not invoke patent law to enforce restrictions on the post-sale use
of their patented products. After the first authorized sale to a purchaser who buys for
use in the ordinary pursuits of life, a patent holder's patent rights have been
58
Subsequently, the district court dismissed the infringement claims
reflect an endorsement by the Supreme Court of post-sale use restrictions once goods
59

These back-and-forth decisions hinge on the interpretation of the Quanta60
decision, which is evaluated infra.61 Indeed, the Federal Circuit held the rehearing en
banc specifically to resolve the issue of post-sale use restrictions for patented products.
Quanta, should
this court overrule Mallinckrodt, to the extent it ruled that a sale of a patented article,
when the sale is made under a restriction that is otherwise lawful and within the scope
62

IV. PATENT EXHAUSTION AND PATENT MISUSE CASE LAW REVIEW
W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
63
th
Affirmative defenses include claiming the patent rights have been
exhausted through an authorized first sale or the patent is unenforceable due to
misuse (see below). In the case of drill bits and ink cartridges and similar rejuvenated
products the additional issue arises if the activities constitute (legal) repair or (illegal)
reconstruction. Begin first with the repair/reconstruction case law.
A. Repair v. Reconstruction
In general, the right to use includes the right to repair so as to extend the
serviceable life of a product.64 But the repair must not be so extensive as effectively to
recreate the product.65 The permitted distinction though is a difficult one to specify.
57 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (reaffirming the validity
of the patent exhaustion doctrine).
58 Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582 (E.D.
Ky. Mar 31, 2009) (reversing Lexmark's Motion for Summary Judgment of Direct Infringement in
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830, 860 (E.D. Ky., Apr. 24,
2007).
59 See Lexmark Int., Inc. v. Ink Technologies Printer Supplies, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41045, 21
(S.D. Ohio 2014).
60 See Quanta, 553 U.S. 617.
61 See infra Section IV.B.
62 See Lexmark Int., Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 785 F.3d at 566 (citations omitted) (the
second request of briefs regarded international exhaustion. Id.).
63 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
64 Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 827 F.2d 755, 758-59 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
65 See id. (stating that the right to repair does not allow the creation of a new product).
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Early Supreme Court cases include ones where the judgment was of permissible
repair and impermissible reconstruction. In Wilson v. Simpson, the case dealt with a
plaining machine for which the cutter blades needed regular replacement while the
remainder of the mechanism was more durable. 66 The Supreme Court decided that
lacement of temporary parts [the cutting blades] does not alter the identity of
the machine, but preserves it . . . . 67 Conversely, in Am. Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons
the Court discovered conditions of reconstruction, not repair, and hence found
infringement.68 The bands at issue were composed of a buckle and metal band which
was placed around cotton bales at the farm and cut to release the cotton at the mill. 69
70 The alleged infringer collected
the severed bands as scrap and riveted them together so as to create a serviceable new
tie.71 The buckle was unchanged.72
old buckle, they acquired no right to combine it with a substantially new band, to make
73
a cottonWhat the defendants did in piecing together the pieces of the old band was
not a repair of the band or the tie, in any proper sense. The band was
voluntarily severed by the consumer at the cotton-mill because the tie had
performed its function of confining the bale of cotton in its transit from the
plantation or the press to the mill. Its capacity for use as a tie was voluntarily
destroyed.74
mention in the decision of the licensed limitation stamped on the bands
75

The lower courts established what can be

76

If new parts so dominate the structural substance of the whole as to justify
the conclusion that it has been made anew, there is a rebuilding or
66 See Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1850) (discussing the plaining machine and its
patent).
67 See id. at 126.
68 See Am. Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 94-95 (1882) (comparing the case with Wilson
and finding reconstruction that constituted infringement, rather than repair that did not constitute
infringement).
69 See id.at 90-91 (describing the invention discussed in the case).
70 See id.at 91 (describing the details of the bands in question).
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 93-94.
74 See Am. Cotton Tie Co., 106 U.S. at 94.
75 See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 334 n.9 (noting
important factors to the decision).
76 See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F. 3d at 1102-03 (stating there is continuum between concepts
of repair and reconstruction and law has developed in the context of diverse facts); Aro Mfg. Corp.,
365 U.S. at 346 (stating test as inquiry whether the parts replaced have made a new whole);
Automotive Parts Co. v. Wisconsin Axel Co., 81 F.2d 125, 127 (1935) (comparing repair and
reconstruction and stating each case should be decided on its facts based on amount of replacements
within machine).
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reconstruction; and conversely, where the original parts, after re-placement,
are so large a part of the whole structural substance as to preponderate over
the new, there has not been a reconstruction but only repair. 77
As significant, the court established a special burden of proof for the defendant to
document the sales were indeed for repair and not re-construction.78
Ordinarily the burden rests upon the plaintiff to show patent infringement,
but in circumstances where there is an admission of sales without reservation
as to the numbers sold or the condition of the original parts, it would seem
only fair that the seller should assume the burden of showing that its acts
were not infringements.79
In Jazz Photo (one of several sequels of this case), Fuji Photo Film Co. sold simple
cameras covered by nine of its patents and intended for single use. 80 However, once
the film was removed and the cameras discarded, several foreign firms known as
81 Fuji
had not restricted the initial sale of the cameras so as to exhaust its patent rights.82
-creation exceeds the rights that
83 It then became the responsibility of the patent holder
ac
to convince the court that remanufacturers reconstructed the products, going well
beyond a simple repair.84
Aro
life than is available from the combination as a whole, is characteristic of repair, not
85 In that case, Aro manufactured both the convertible top mechanism
as well as the fabric cover.86 Convertible Top supplied only the less durable (and nonpatented) top material which was ruled to be a repair and not a refurbishment. 87 In
Jazz Photo,
remanufacturing processes simply reuse the original components,
such that there is no issue of replacing parts that were separately patented. If the
claimed component is not replaced, but simply is reused, this component is neither
88
repaired nor reconstruc
With the proportionality test and other considerations the courts have made the
delineation between repair and reconstruction relatively straightforward. Consider
See Automotive Parts Co., 81 F.2d at 127.
See id.at 127-28 (establishing burden of proof).
79 See id.
80 See Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1099-111 (describing camera, its method of use, and the
patents involved).
81 See id.at 1101 (describing refurbishing by remanufacturers).
82 See id. (reciting ap
83 See id. at 1105.
84 See id. at 1102 (stating that complainant must establish cause of action in infringement).
85 See Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1107.
86 See Aro Mfg. Corp., 365 U.S. at 337 (listing elements of patent); see also Jazz Photo Corp., 264
F.3d at 1103 (describing patent at issue in Aro).
87 See Aro Mfg. Corp., 365 U.S. at 339 (describing fabric supplied by respondent Convertible Top
as one element of entire patent).
88 See Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1107 (explaining the implications of reusing parts).
77
78
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next the matter of patent exhaustion, and its component part, implied license. Indeed,
the right to repair a patented product is closely associated with patent exhaustion. 89
And with implied license; that is, repair is an affirmative defense of implied license. 90
B. Patent Exhaustion/Implied License
1. Early Cases
Critical boundaries to the patent monopoly were established in the 19th century.
The Supreme Court in Bloomer v. McQuewan91
to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes
92 And in
outside of it, and is no longer un
Adams the Supreme Court ruled:
But, in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person
having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its
use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to
restrict that use. The article passes without the limit of the monopoly. That
is to say, the patentee or his as-signee having in the act of sale received all
the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in
that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees. 93
The true ground on which these decisions rest is that the sale by a person
who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it
the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used
in point of time.94

95

Just the prior year in Mitchell
sold to be used in the ordinary pursuits of life become the private individual property
of the purchasers, and are no longer specifically protected by the patent laws of the

89 See Amber Hatfield Rovner, Practical Guide to Application of (or Defense Against) ProductBased Infringement Immunities Under the Doctrines of Patent Exhaustion and Implied License, 12
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 227, 271 (2004) (claiming the right to repair is derived from exhaustion of
patent rights).
90 See Dana Corp., 827 F.2d at 758 (confirming that the right to repair is an affirmative defense).
91 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1853).
92 See id. at 549 (explaining the implications of selling a patented machine).
93 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873).
94 See id. at 455.
95 See id. (suggesting the concept of authorized sale).
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96 Thus the principal
State where the implements or m
of patent exhaustion with the first sale would seem to have been well established even
into the mid-1800s.97 But as Justice Bradley pointed out in dissent in Adams, the
matter is not so straightforward.98
The facts of Adams apply to an improved coffin lid patent which was licensed for
the right to make, use, and sell in an area restricted to a ten mile radius centered on
the city of Boston.99 Burke, an undertaker, purchased the lids from the licensee but
sold and employed them in burials outside the licensed trade area and was
subsequently sued for infringement.100 The majority decided the initial sale and
licensing of the patent rights freed the purchaser from claim of the patentee. 101 Justice
Bradley, however, noted from Washburn v. Gould:

The eleventh section of the [patent] act [of 1836] expressly authorizes not
only the assignment of a whole patent . . .
exclusive right under any patent, to make and use, and to grant to others to
make and use the thing patented within and throughout any specified part
102

Bradley continued by musing:
If it be contended that the right of vending the lids to others enables them to
confer upon their vendees the right to use the lids thus sold outside of the
limited district, the question at once arises, how can they confer upon their
vendees a right which they cannot exercise themselves? 103
n the
limited district which the patentee himself previously had in the whole United States,
and no more, it is difficult to know what meaning to attach to language however
104

Indeed, Mitchell hinted that the absolute exhaustion of patent rights following
first sale applied only to unconditional sales. 105
Sales of the kind may be made by the patentee with or without conditions, as
in other cases, but where the sale is absolute, and without any conditions, the
96 See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872) (limiting the patent monopoly right to the
term of the patent).
97 See id. (discussing the idea of patent exhaustion in the mid-1800s).
98 See Adams, 84 U.S. at 459 (discussing the nuances of the issue).
99 See id. at 458 (stating the facts of the case).
100 See id. at 454 (stating the issues surrounding the case).
101 See id. at 457 (holding that that once lawfully sold there is no restriction on their use).
102 See id. at 457-58 (quoting Blanchard v. Eldridge, 3 F. Cas. 624, 624 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849)
(indicating the argument on behalf of defendant). See also Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 316
(C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (using similar language discussing exclusive right to whole patent).
103 See Adams, 84 U.S. at 458-59.
104 See id. at 458.
105 See Mitchell, 83 U.S. at 546-47 (suggesting that patent exhaustion applied only to
unconditional sales).
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rule is well settled that the purchaser may continue to use the implement or
machine purchased until it is worn out, or he may repair it or improve upon
it as he pleases, in same manner as if dealing with property of any other
kind.106
By the turn of the next century the Supreme Court was showing more flexibility
on allowing license limitations to restrict patent exhaustion. 107 And in 1938 it ruled,
field . . . [T]he owner of a patent may grant licenses to manufacture, use, or sell upon
108

the sales to [another] outside the scope of its license, [a seller] infring[es] the patents
embodied in the [product]. [A buyer], having with knowledge of the facts bought at
sales constituting infringement, [does] itself infringe the patents embodied in the
109
110
he valid terms of a license is . . .
enses for a restricted use is an old one. So far as appears,
111 The case applied to a restriction to a licensee
for manufacturing and selling patented amplifiers. 112 The patents-in-suit had distinct
uses for commercial applications (theatres) and private use (radio reception). 113 The
petitioner bought from a firm licensed solely for supplying the personal market but
also provided equipment to theatres, in violation of its license agreement, and hence
was found to be infringing.114
patentee for the use of his invention by showing that the use is within his license; but,
if his use be one prohibited by the license, the latter is of no avail as a defense. As a
license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of
115

2. Federal Circuit Cases
The Federal Circuit established its basic interpretation of license use restrictions
on patented products in Mallinckrodt. That case involved a medical apparatus used for
inhaling, and subsequently on exhaling traps a radioactive mist for pulmonary
106

See id. at 548.

107

required for patent
exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of
property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use
Id. at 91.
108 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938),
, 305
U.S. 124 (1938).
109 See id. at 181-82.
110 See id. at 124, 126.
111 See id. at 127.
112 See id. at 126 (stating the facts of the case).
113 See id.at 127 (discussing the possible uses of the licensed technology).
114 See Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 180 (noting that the license was confined to supplying
the personal market).
115 De Forest Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927).
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diagnosis and treatments.116
instead of discarding it after initial use hospitals sold it to Medipart for
117 Because the use limitation revealed the label
applied only following the sale, this created a post-sale restriction. Mallinckrodt sued
Medipart for infringement on the grounds of reconstruction, not repair, and lost in the
district court.118 The district court also decided based primarily on Bauer I (one of
Bauer
Motion Picture Patents that
restriction to a single use was unenforceable.119 The relevant issue for the appeals
court involved the permissibility of a license restriction under any circumstances.
The appeals court first determined that the cases on which the district court had
ruled were inappropriate as they applied to illegal acts under the antitrust laws. 120
fixing while Motion Picture Patents mandated the equipment be used only with films
leased from the patentee, an illegal tying arrangement. 121 The court then dispatched
the issue of the relevance of whether the first seller was the patentee, retailer, or a
licensee.122 Referencing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.123 the court ruled,
whether the reseller had purchased the merchandise or was merely acting as an agent
124

Reviewing a number of Supreme Court cases the appeals court determined the
125

The appropriate criterion [for the legality of the license restrictions] is
whether Mallinckrodt's restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or
whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent grant and into
behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of
reason.
Should the restriction be found to be reasonably within the patent grant, i.e.,
that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims, that
ends the inquiry. However, should such inquiry lead to the conclusion that
there are anticompetitive effects extending beyond the patentee's statutory
right to exclude, these effects do not automatically impeach the restriction. 126

116 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the patented device at issue in
the case).
117 See id. (clarifying the reuse of the device despite a single use marking).
118 See id. (stating the procedural history of the case).
is presented in Section IV.A and that dimension of the case is not of further relevance here.
119 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 703 (noting precedent relied upon by the lower court).
120 See id. at 704 (emphasizing the differences between the cases).
121 See id.
r sale and use at a price not less than one
122 See id. at 703 (recognizing the difference of purchasing from a patentee as opposed to a
manufacturing licensee).
123 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
124 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 705.
125 See id. at 708.
126 See id.
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That is, a rule of reason analysis should be applied, as in all such cases. 127 The
128

Additional Federal Circuit cases of direct relevance here apply specifically to cases
of saved Roundup Ready (RR) soybean seeds. 129 In McFarling the defendant allegedly
saved and reused RR soybean seeds in violation of the Technology Agreement, which
he acknowledged having signed.130 Scruggs for his part planted RR soybeans and
cotton, and acknowledged saving seed from both for replanting. 131 As an initial defense
it was noted the Technology Agreement was never signed, which itself violated the
license agreement Monsanto had with its seed sellers. 132
McFarling
selection, antitrust violation (tying new RR seed purchases to old) and, of particular
relevance here, patent exhaustion, citing Univis.133 The Federal Circuit first
remained within the scope of the
134 Then:
implicated,
as the new seeds grown from the original batch had never been sold. The price
construct new seeds, and since the new seeds were not sold by the patentee
they entailed no principle of patent exhaustion. 135
Scruggs sought to have the Monsanto patents-in-suit as well as other patents
invalidated, to no avail at the district court level. 136 His affirmative defenses involved:
-in-suit; (2) the existence of an implied license
to use the Monsanto technology; (3) the doctrine of patent exhaustion; (4) violation of
137 Of
the Plant Variety Protection Act; (5) patent misuse
these, numbers (2) and (3) are of particular relevance here. As regards the implied
license, the appeals court determined:

See id. (explaining test as one of whether restriction is reasonable).
See id. at 709. See supra Section IV.A (discussing reconstruction versus repair).
129 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (indicating plaintiff saved RR
soybeans). See also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (indicating same).
130 McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1293 (stating plaintiff signed agreement and does not dispute he
saved seed).
131 See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333 (indicating plaintiff saved RR soybeans and pa-tented cotton
seeds for replanting).
132 See id. (stating plaintiff did not sign the licensing agreement).
133 See McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1298 (quoting Univis, 316 U.S. at 249) (arguing Monsanto violated
doctrines of patent exhaustion and first sale because when purchaser acquires a product he acquires
right to use and sell it).
134 See id. at 1299.
135 See id. (internal citation omitted).
136 See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1333-34 (summarizing proceedings below and noting permanent
injunction was issued against Scruggs); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d. 568, 572
127
128

137

See id. at 1334.
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undisputed that Monsanto requires all licensees to place a notice on all bags
of Roundup Ready seeds stating that the seeds are covered by U.S. Patents,
that the purchase of the seeds conveys no license, and that a license from
Monsanto must be obtained before using the seeds. Therefore, the
circumstances of the sale indicate that Scruggs had no implied license to use
Monsanto's patented biotechnology. Furthermore, because the seed
distributors had no authority to confer a right to use Monsanto's
biotechnology, they could not confer any sort of license to use the seeds. 138
As regards patent exhaustion, Scruggs argued that he had obtained the seeds in
exhaustion permitted him
unencumbered use.139 The appeals court saw matters differently and held that:
The doctrine of patent exhaustion is inapplicable in this case. There was no
unrestricted sale because the use of the seeds by seed growers was
condition
sale of the second generation seed to Scruggs, there can be no patent
exhaustion. The fact that a patented technology can replicate itself does not
give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the technology. Applying
the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations of self-replicating technology
would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder. 140
The recent Federal Circuit en banc Lexmark decision considered patent
exhaustion issues in detail.141 As noted above, given the domestic focus of this
article,142 the international production and trade issues of the case are not considered
here. Overall, the court reaffirmed the Mallinckrodt 143 decision following the Supreme
Court ruling in Quanta Computer.144 Referencing the Patent Act, 145 the court stated,
See id. at 1336 (internal citations omitted). The district court had previously decided Scruggs
se Monsanto's patented biotechnology unless they
See id.at 1334.
139 See id.
implied license).
140 See id. at 1336 (citing McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1299) (reasoning that the biotechnology, which
138

See Lexmark, 816 F.3d. 721.
See supra Section I.
143 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d; Lexmark
We find
Mallinckrodt's principle to remain sound after the Supreme Court's decision in Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. in which the Court did not have before it or address a patentee sale at all,
let alone one made subject to a restriction, but a sale made by a separate manufacturer under a
patentee144 See Quanta, 553 U.S. 617. See infra Section IV.B.
145 35 U.S.C § 271(a) (Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent).
141
142
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§ 271(a) by its terms requires that whoever engages in the enumerated acts
receive permission from the patentee (directly or indirectly) for the acts being
performed, which otherwise are infringing; and nothing in § 271(a) constrains the
patentee's choices about whom to grant the required authority, if anyone, or about
146

Defendant Impression argued that Lexmark exhausted its patent rights despite
the clearlycartridges because
Lexmark itself sold the cartridges rather than licensing a third party. 147 That
argument lacked persuasiveness under Mallinckrodt.148 A sale made under a clearly
communicated, otherwise-lawful restriction as to post-sale use or resale does not confer
149

remedied under the patent law, provided that no other law prevents enforcement of
the patent."150
In dissent, Judges Dyk and Hughes argue that permitting post-sale restrictions
conditions on the sale of a patented item would indeed largely eviscerate the
exhaustion doctrine, by permitting the imposition of all manner of post-sale
restrictions except for tie-ins, price-fixing, and other violations of the patent misuse
151

3. Supreme Court Cases
Two cases dominate the current rulings of the Supreme Court on patent
exhaustion, Univis152 and Quanta Computer.153
had patents for lens blanks for
use in multifocal eyeglasses.154 There were sixteen patents in total, three unrelated to
the case, five for producing the lenses and eight for finished lenses of different sizes,
shapes and refractive powers.155 The firm manufactured the lens blanks and licensed
them in three classes, (1) wholesalers, who ground the lenses to specifications from
prescriptions retailers, (2) finishing retailers who had in-house grinding facilities, and
(3) the prescriptions retailers who utilized the lens grinding resources of the

See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 743.
See id. at 735 (specifying the contention of Impression and the government).
148 Use in violation of a valid restriction may be remedied under the patent law, provided that
no other law prevents enforcement of the patent."
149 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 743.
150 See id.at 737 (quoting Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701).
151 See id.at 779-80.
152 See Univis, 316 U.S. at 243 (stating the nature of the claims that the eye glass lens company
had violated either the resale provision of the Sherman act or was engaging in monopolization of the
industry).
153 See Quanta,
atent exhaustion applies to the sale
of components of a patented system that must be combined with additional components in order to
146
147

154
155

not).

See Univis, 316 U.S. at 243 (explaining patent held by Univis).
See id.at 246-47 (explaining which patents were at issue in the case in chief and which were
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wholesalers.156 The license terms specified a fixed price for wholesalers of the ground
lenses, while both classes of retailers agreed to sell only at prices specified by Univis. 157
The grinding process itself proved as non-novel and applicable to any form of multifocal lenses.158 An
licensing.159
The government presented a price fixing case which raised the ancillary issue of
whether the license restrictions were legitimate extensions of the patent monopoly. 160
They were not, ruled the Court, as the sale exhausted the patent rights. 161 The court
reasoned that
[t]he first vending of any article manufactured under a patent puts the article
beyond the reach of the monopoly which that patent confers. Whether the
licensee sells the patented article in its completed form or sells it before
completion for the purpose of enabling the buyer to finish and sell it, he has
equally parted with the article.162
But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not
163

Quanta Computer relates to three patents-in-suit purchased by the respondent. 164
The patents apply to methods for controlling the transfer of data between the
microprocessor and other devices like the keyboard, etc. 165 Particularly, the patentsin-suit disclose a system for ensuring the most recent data are retrieved, and for
updating the memory when older data are sought.166 Another patent provides for
managing data traffic, in part by establishing a rotating priority system.167
-licensed a patent portfolio, including
the patents-in-suit, to Intel Corporation au
or indirectly), offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of its own products practicing
168
169 Additional
156 See id. at 243-44 (treating two corporate entities involved with interlocking ownership which
the Supreme Court treated as a single corporation and that as single entity, it issued classes of licenses
to various retailers).
157 See id. at 244 (describing licensing agreement between corporation and licensees).
158 See id.
is applied to an article which embodies the only novel features of the alleged
159 See id.
to license certain prescription retailers as licensees).
160 See Univis, 316 U.S. at 253-54 (discussing the potential extensions of the patent monopoly).
161 See id. (holding that finished lenses had undergone a process that would be free from the
price restriction of the corporation and thus fit within patent protection under United States patent
law).
162 See id. at 252.
163 See id. at 250.
164 See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 621 (listing the patents at issue).
165 See id. (providing a simple explanation of the patent subject matter).
166 See id. at 621-23 (describing the purpose of the patent portfolio).
167 See id. at 622-23 (noting the thrust of Patent No. 5,077,733).
168 See id. at 623 (describing the facts of the case).
169 See id. (describing the form of the Agreement and its referenced title).
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limitations in the License Agreement included no license was
hereto . . . to any third party for the combination by a third party of Licensed Products
of either party with items, components, or the like acquired . . . from sources other than
170 The
a party hereto, or for the u
herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would
171
otherwise apply when a pa
give written notice to its own customers informing them that, while it had obtained a
product that you purchase is licensed by LGE
expressly or by implication, to any product that you make by combining an Intel
172 This Agre
product with any nonof this Agreement shall have no effect on and shall not be grounds for termination of
173

LGE argued that exhaustion did not apply to its method patents. 174 The Court
countered by noting it had frequentl
175

could simply add method claims to their filings.176
The Court would then go on to determine that
Univis
Univis, the incomplete article substantially
embodies the patent because the only step necessary to practice the patent is the
179 The distinction
between a case related to removing material (grinding lenses) to practice the patent,
and a case where components (buss) were added, was not significant. 180
181 Nor is the
exhaustion analysis affected by the fact that more than a single patent is used in the
177

178

See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 623.
See id.
172 See id. at 623-24.
173 See id. at 624.
174 See id.
175 See id.
claims).
176 See id. at 629 (explaining that by drafting patent claims to de-scribe a method rather than an
e exhaustion doctrine entirely).
177 See id.
178 See id. at 631.
179 See id. at 633.
180 See id. at 634 (reporting that for the purposes of its analysis, it did not matter whether
material was removed, as it was in Univis, or components added, as they were in Quanta).
181 See id.
170
171
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same product.182

that

183

Remaining to be decided involved whether the sale to Quanta exhausted the
patent rights.184 LGE argued that its license agreement with Intel required Intel to
notify its customers that LGE did not license those customers to practice its patents,
but neither party contended that Intel had breached the agreement in that regard. 185
LGE further cont
parties to practice the patents by combining licensed products with other
186

parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts its right to
practice the patents based not on implied license but on exhaustion. And exhaustion
187

[license] conditions limited Intel's authority to sell products substantially embodying
the patents. Because Intel was authorized to sell its products to Quanta, the doctrine
of patent exhaustion prevents LGE from further asserting its patent rights with
188
respect to the patents substantially embo
This case is by some considered to end post-sale restrictions permitted in
Malinckrodt189 while not expressly overruling it. Certainly that was the interpretation
of the district court,190 but then that decision was reversed by the appeals court.191 The
differences in interpretation hinged to a large degree on whether Quanta192 constituted
a general ruling, or limited to the very specific language of the license agreement
that the Quanta holding is limited to the very specific
193 For the
simply cannot be squared with the position that the Quanta holding is limited to its
194
195 The principal
Office, which considers the Mallinckrodt
basis for that interpretation was the distinction between selling and leasing. Long

182 See id. at 634embodying patent B, its relationship to patent A does not prevent exhaustion of p
emphasis omitted)).
183 See id. at 634-35 (emphasis in original) (stressing the proper considerations with respect to
exhaustion when more than one patent is at issue).
184 See id. at 635185 See id.

See id. at 637.
See id.
188 See id. at 637.
189 See Malinckrodt, 976 F.2d. 700.
190 See Static Control Components,
As Lexmark points out, the Supreme
Court did not expressly overrule Mallinckrodt in its Quanta
191 See Lexmark
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart,
Inc. (citation omitted)).
192 See Quanta, 553 U.S.
193 See Static Control 615 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
194 See id.at 586.
195
Brief for the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae, Case 14186
187
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Supreme Court tradition had prohibited post sale conditions following an authorized
sale, but, citing U.S. v. General Elec. Co.196
197

The appeals court in response emphasized that in Quanta198
199 as the case did not involve an
addressing the patent-sale/licenseactual sale. Mallinckrodt
200 U.S. v. General Electric Co., cited by the
restrictive lic
Solicitor General, does though draw a clear distinction over post-sale control by sale or
201 The
202
former is restricted, the latter allowed.
The appeals court though does identify an
produce and sell the patented product him/her self would have less post-sale control
than if he/she licensed another to do the production and marketing, something the
courts have never suggested.203
two definitions of
- It can happen
only under certain conditions, and (2) a circumstance indispensable to some result;
prerequisite; that on which something else is contingent: as in - conditions of
Mallinckrodt follows definition (1), a limiting
circumstance for post-sale use. Earlier rulings were in the context of definition (2), a
requirement to be completed prior to the transfer of title. 204 However if the practice of
the linguistic issue would evaporate.
A Supreme Court review is widely anticipated, and indeed the Court has invited
the Solicitor General to file an amicus curiae brief on the issues. 205

196 See General Elec. 272 U.S. at 489But the question is a different one which arises when
we consider what a patentee who grants a license to one to make and vend the patented article may

See U.S. Brief at 14.
See Quanta, 553 U.S. 617.
199 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 739.
200 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d. at 704.
201 See General Electric Co., 272 U.S. at 485.
202 See id.
197
198

See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 744.
See e.g.,
The first question to be considered
is, whether the transaction in question was a conditional sale or a mortgage; that is, whether it was a
mere agreement to sell upon a cond
205
The Solicitor General
203
204

[16:411 2017] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

434

4. Implied License
Cases specifically addressing implied license are relatively rare, although an
implied license defense is distinct from one based on patent exhaustion. 206 The Federal
Circuit has identified that
license by virtue of a sale of non-patented equipment used to practice a patented
207

the circumstances of the sale must plainly indicate that the grant of a license should
208

signifies a patentee's waiver of the statutory right to exclude others from making,
209
using, or selling
No formal granting of a license is necessary in order to give it effect. Any
language used by the owner of the patent, or any conduct on his part
exhibited to another, from which that other may properly infer that the owner
consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon
which the other acts, constitutes a license and a defense to an action for a
210 Implied licenses may arise from several sources, but most commonly
uct.211
Jazz Photo, Fuji, the
manufacturer, attempted to argue that the camera box label which contained
instructions and warnings about damage and an electric shock potential constituted
an implied license for a single use, which was violated by the repair. 212 The court cited
Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Manufacturing Corp.213 regarding implied
licenses.214
create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, sell, or modify a patented product
215

A similar decision in Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Technology, Inc rejected
warning labels on reuse as an implied license,216 which applied to a medical device for
206 See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 6
But the question whether third parties received implied
licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts its right to practice the patents based not on implied
207 Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter
Met-Coil Systems].
208 See id.
209 In re Singer Co. N.V., 262 B.R. 257, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
210 De Forest Tel. & Tel., 273 U.S. at 241.
211 See In re Singer Co. N.V., 262 B.R. at 267 (explaining that the extensive period of time during
212 See Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1108 (explaining that the instructions and warnings of risk were
not mutual promises or conditions placed upon the sale, and that it would be improper to imply a
license limitation).
213 Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Manufacturing Corp., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
214 See Jazz Photo, 264 F.3d at 1108 (indicating that the determination of an express or implied
license or contract is a matter of law).
215 See id. at 1108 (quoting Hewlett-Packard 123 F.3d at 1453).
216 Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical Technology, Inc., 85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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adding healing by applying compressive pressure to limbs. 217 The compression sleeve
needed replacing after each use, not because it was worn out but as a precaution
against infection.218 The sleeves contained marks indicating
USE ONLY. DO NOT REUSE."219 Users indeed followed that heading but often did
not purchase replacements from Kendall but rather from a third party, who received
a lawsuit for infringing the Kendall patent. 220 The court concluded the regular
replacements were indeed allowable repair, and that there was no implied license
mandating the replacements be purchased from the patentee. 221
Per Met-Coil Systems
only in per
222

license arises where an original sale is accompanied by an express notice negating the
223
grant of an impli
A second issue under implied license is the availability of non-infringing
alternative uses, the idea being that the purchaser of a patented product acquires the
right to practice it, and if that right necessitates an otherwise infringing activity then
the activity is, under an implied license, non-infringing.224 From Univis
authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a
225 Or earlier
from Adams:
[b]ut, in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the person
having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in its
use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to
restrict that use. The article passes without the limit of the monopoly. That
is to say, the patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the
royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his invention in that
particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees. 226

217
218

risks).

See id at 1571-72 (explaining the invention protected by U.S. Patent 4,253,449).
See id at 1572 (describing the sleeve as being a one-time-use item, due to contamination

See id. (emphasis in original).
See id. (reporting the circumstances behind the lawsuit).
221 See id. at 1574worn out, it was not feasible to continue using them, and that the re-pair doctrine was therefore
applicable).
222 See Met-Coil Systems, 803 F.2d at 687 (quot
750 F.2d 903, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
223 See id.at 686 (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612, 615 (2d Cir. 1937); General
, 280 F. 846, 851 (2d Cir. 1922)).
224 See Univis, 316 U.S. at 249 (implying sale passes all rights, including that of practice in a
certain manner); Adams 84 U.S. at 456 (stating payment of royalty for use of patented item conveys
all rights, including right to use in various ways); John W. Schlicher, The New Patent Exhaustion
Doctrine of Quanta v. L.G.: What it Means for Patent Owners, Licensees, and Product Customers, 90
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC Y 758, 770 (2008) (discussing implied license as granting full rights so
long as the price covered both the patented item and its patented use).
225 See Univis, 316 U.S. at 249.
226 See Adams, 84 U.S. at 456.
219
220
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The available non-infringing use, though, need not be the most profitable. 227
held that a legally acceptable non-infringing use need not be as profitable as the
228
patented method
C. Antitrust Violations and Patent Misuse
229 component of the conditional sales rulings
implies that unlawful restrictions invalidate a patent, rendering it unenforceable,
which is to say infringement suits are non-allowable, at least for as long as the
restriction remains in force.230 In this sub-section we explore the case history of when
license restrictions are ruled unlawful. They fall into two related categories, antitrust
violations and patent misuse; we proceed in the order.

1. Antitrust Violations
The grant of a United States patent allows the patent holder on threat of
infringement to prohibit others from making, using, offering to sell, or selling any
patented invention, within the United States or imported into the United States, his
or her invention.231
A patentee may grant licenses to make, use, or vend his
patented invention, restricted in point of space or time, or with any other restriction
upon the exercise of the granted privilege, save only that by attaching a condition to
his license he may not enlarge his monopoly and thus acquire some other which the
232

The extent of that [monopoly] right is limited by the definition of his invention,
as its boundaries are marked by the specifications and claims of the patent. He may
grant licenses to make, use or vend, restricted in point of space or time, or with any
other restriction upon the exercise of the granted privilege, save only that by attaching
a condition to his license he may not enlarge his monopoly and thus acquire some other
233 That is, there remain:
which
[E]established limits which the patentee must not exceed in employing the
leverage of his patent to control or limit the operations of the licensee. Among
other restrictions upon him, he may not condition the right to use his patent
on the licensee's agreement to purchase, use, or sell, or not to purchase, use,
Glass Equip. Dev. Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (indicating that
-infringing use be the most profitable
alternative was not correct).
228 See id.
229 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 743 (describing the legality of pre-sale license limitations. See supra
Section IV.C).
230 Morton Salt v. Suppiger Co.,
Equity may rightly withhold its
assistance from such [an abusive] use of the patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement,
and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has been abandoned
and that the consequen
231 35 U.S.C § 271(a) (Infringement of patent).
232 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940).
233 See id.
227
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or sell, another article of commerce not within the scope of his patent
monopoly. His right to set the price for a license does not extend so far,
whatever privilege he has to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate. And
just as the patent's leverage may not be used to extract from the licensee a
commitment to purchase, use, or sell other products according to the desires
of the patentee, neither can that leverage be used to garner as royalties a
percentage share of the licensee's receipts from sales of other products; in
either case, the patentee seeks to extend the monopoly of his patent to derive
a benefit not attributable to use of the patent's teachings. 234
Following the passage of the major antitrust acts in 1890 235 and 1914236, those
237 rendering
onditions violate public policy,
however, as in the case of price-fixing conditions and tying restraints, the underlying
patents become unenforceable, and the patentee loses its right to sue for infringement
238
rights and welfare of the community,
the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has
239

Specific connection with the Sherman Act was established in United Shoe
Machinery Corporation et al. v. United States, 240
protect the making of contracts in restraint of trade or those which tend to monopolize
ights conferred by
patents are indeed very definite and extensive, but they do not give any more than
other rights a universal license against positive prohibitions. The Sherman Antitrust
Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, ch. 647, is a limitation of rights, rights that may be
241 United Shoe similarly noted
that the Clayton Act applies to patented products as well. 242
Not mentioned in this case law is Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act of
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
243

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969).
Sherman Act 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 et seq. (1890).
236 Clayton Act 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
237 United Shoe Machinery Corporation et al. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922)
patent right confers no privilege to make contracts in themselves illegal, and certainly not to make
those directly violative o
See also Transparent-Wrap Machine
234
235

to violate the anti-trust laws. Such violations may arise through conditions in the license whereby the
licensor seeks to control the conduct of the licensee by the fixing of prices or by other restrictive
238
, 616 F.3d 1318, 1339(Fed. Cir. 2010) (in a case
regarding a licensing prohibition to avoid licensing a potentially competing technology).
239 Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1972).
240 See United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 464-65.
241 Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Company v. United States of America, 226 U.S. 20, 49
(1912).
242 See United Shoe
243

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
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Section 5 have been interpreted to be coterminous with the Sherman and Clayton
Acts244 such as price fixing.245 FTC actions do differ in that they are generally civil
acts administered through administrative proceedings before the Commission rather
than through the courts.246
There exists though a component of these FTC powers which exceeds the scope
granted by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. That interpretation was made particularly
clear in
An anticompetitive practice
need not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act or the Clayton Act in order to violate the
which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though
itself looks to antitrust principles in deciding whether § 5 of the FTC Act has been
247

Moreover the Department of Justice jointly with the FTC issued in 1995 the
Commission may take administrative action against conduct that violates the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, as well as anti-competitive practices that do not fall
248

interpretation of the powers of the FTC in section 5 go back to FTC v. Brown Shoe,
The Federal Trade Commission has power under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an
outright violation of § 3
de practices which conflict with the basic policies of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these
249

Further, the broader applicability of section 5 had been endorsed back in 1953 by
the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.
5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act are not confined to those that were illegal at common law or
that were condemned by the Sherman Act. Congress advisedly left the concept flexible
250

The courts though have the final word by means of the option for defendants to
appeal FTC decisions as protection against the abuse of power by the Commission. 251
Often that authority is used to limit the scope of FTC actions regarding the

244

15 U.S.C. §§ 12 27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52 53.

245
246

FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F. 2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the

247

omitted).
248

th

Cir. 1987) (citations

Enforcement Guidelines for International

FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322, 320 (1966).
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953)
(citation omitted).
251 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 235 (1972).
249
250

[16:411 2017] The Courts Interpretations of Legitimate Business Purposes ,
with Applications to Lexmark

439

evident in E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, a case
involving the pricing of a lead-based antiknock agent to gasoline. 252 In its
administrative hearing the FTC had found the two largest suppliers of the compound
unfairly facilitated the maintenance of substantial,
uniform price levels and the reduction or elimination of price competition in the leadbased antiknock market."253 despite the fact that the adoption of the practices at issue
were non-collusive.254
The appeals court faulted the FTC for not recognizing the legitimate business
255

Thus, even if the Commission has authority under § 5 to forbid legitimate, noncollusive business practices which substantially lessen competition, there has not been
a sufficient showing of lessening of competition in the instant case to permit the
256 The FTC order was set aside.257
938 by the
Wheeler-Lea Act258 and are often referred to as the consumer protection clause. As
explained in the House Report on the amendment summarizing congressional
thinking, "This amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair
trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer
injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor." 259 It was however not until
1964 that the FTC articulated the factors to be considered, which were later referenced
by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson 260 as:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law, or otherwise -- whether, in other words, it is within
at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established
concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or
competitors or other businessmen).261
Because of the cigarette advertising and Sperry & Hutchinson connections, these
principals are often referred to as the Cigarette Rule or S&H Rule.
Within a decade, the FTC had established explicit policies on the concepts of

252

1984).

E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 729 F.2d 128 (Ct. App. 2nd Cir.

See id. at 133.
See id. at 130.
255 See id. at 138-140.
256 See id. at 142.
257 See id. at 130.
258 Ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
259 H. R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937). See also S. Rep. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2-3 (1936).
260 See Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 244.
261 Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive
Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking. 29 Fed. Reg.
8355 (1964).
253
254
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as the violations are distinct and independent.262 First
263 Making reference to the S&H Rule, the policy identifies
three criterion:
The injury must be substantial.
Injury usually involves monetary harm, but can also include the purchase
of unwanted goods or services, or defective ones, or unwarranted health
or safety risks.
The injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer or
competitive benefits. Included are considerations of the costs a remedy
would entail, along with the burdens to society in general of a regulation.
The injury must be one which consumers could not reasonably have
avoided.
While it is generally assumed that consumers are able to make their own private
purchase decisions without regulatory intervention, certain types of sales techniques
may prevent customers from effectively making their own choices. 264
Policies regarding deception were released in 1983. 265 Three elements underlying
all deception cases were identified as:
There must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer.
Misleading or deceptive practices have been found to include false oral or written
representations, misleading price claims, sales of hazardous or systematically
defective products or services without adequate disclosures, failure to disclose
information regarding pyramid sales, use of bait and switch techniques, failure to
perform promised services, and failure to meet warranty obligations.
The practice is assessed from the perspective of a consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, or a group perspective if the practice is
focused on particular groups.
The representation, omission, or practice must be a material one.
Materiality applies when the act or practice is likely to affect the consumer's
conduct or decision with regard to a product or service. 266
The Congressional response to these policy statements did not come until 1994,
with the enactment of 15 U.S.C. § 45(n):
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of
this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act
or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
262

Supervision is a federal banking
263 FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, Dec. 17, 1980. Appended to a letter to Senators Ford
and Danforth, Consumer Subcommittee.
264 See id. at 3.
265 FTC Policy Statement on Deception, October 14, 1983.
Incorporated in a letter to
Representative Dingell, Chair, Committee on Energy and Commerce.
266 See id. at 1-2.
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consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is
unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence
to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations
may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.
With this amendment, the Congress removed the option of the Commission using
public policy as a primary basis for determining unfairness.
2. Patent Misuse
The misuse non-statutory doctrine, which emerged as a positive defense to
infringement claims,267 has a complex and varied relationship with antitrust
'physical or temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect." 268 An
antitrust violation constitutes misuse, but misuse does not necessarily imply an
antitrust violation.269
While the courts have yet to develop an overall theory of misuse, leading at times
policy which includes inventions within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that
is not embraced in the invention. It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it is
270 That is, a patent is intended as a careful balance
contrary to publi
between the private incentive to invest in inventive activities allowed by a temporary
limited monopoly verses the public benefit from access to new products and methods
brought forth by that investment.271 Tipping the balance too far toward private benefit
would then be contrary to that carefully construed policy.
The most common forms of misuse are tying agreements 272, agreements not to
deal with competitive products,273 and (vertical) price fixing post-sale.274 Conditioning
a license on the stipulation of assigning any improvement patents to the licensor has
however been allowed.275

See Primco Corp., 616 F.3d at 1321.
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
269 See Hunter Douglas 44
A patentee who uses a patent to violate the
antitrust laws is guilty of patent misuse; if a patentee's action does not qualify as an antitrust
267
268

See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492.
Joan FarreUSPTO Economic Working Paper Series No. 2015Am. Econ. Review 59(1969): 18-28.
272 Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp,. 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931) (regarding
a tying requirement for an unpatented component essential for the functioning of the patented
product).
273 See Primco Corp., 616 F.3d at 1321.
270
271

274
275 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 329 U.S. 637 (1947) (allowing license
restrictions requiring improvements discovered by the licensee be patented by the licensor).
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patentee an exclusive right to make, use and vend the particular device described and
276
277 From
who misuses a patent does not also necessarily vi
Morton Salt,
violated the Clayton Act, for we conclude that in any event the maintenance of the
present suit to restrain petitioner's manufacture or sale of the alleged infringing
machines is contrary to public policy and that the district court rightly dismissed the
278

a Sherman Act violation in that a licensee who asserts it need prove neither
anticompetitive effects, nor individual harm. Patent misuse may be shown from the
totality of licensor's conduct and business practices. Thus, patent misuse may be seen
as having a less stringent standing requirement and a lesser burden of proof than an
279

Stated somewhat differently in Hunter-Douglas:280
In the abstract, the ultimate issue in determining the merit of a patent
misuse defense is whether the patentee has sought to wrongfully extend the
rights granted under the patent statute; not whether the patentee has
violated the antitrust laws per se. Read in that light, it would in all cases
make perfect sense as a matter of law to group the patent misuse defense
with patent rather than antitrust issues. Practically speaking, however, a
party claiming patent misuse predicated on alleged antitrust violations will
present its most forceful case which will entail showing the patentee to be a
violator of the antitrust laws. Thus, one missing the primary target of
establishing antitrust liability may nonetheless meet the lesser burden of
showing misuse. Antitrust and patent misuse, therefore, are connected as a
matter of fact.
In this regard, patent holders with market power may be held to a higher level of
scrutiny than
281

In 1988 with the passage of the Patent Misuse Reform
components to Section 271(d) of the Patent Act:

Act 282

Congress added two

See Morton Salt, 314 U.S.at 491.
See Hunter Douglas, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (addressing plaintiff's patent claims from
defendant's antitrust counterclaims).
278 See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
279 Transitron Electronic Corporation v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 891 (D. Mass.
1980) (citations excluded) (suit over a license agreement alleging fraud, antitrust violation and patent
misuse).
280 See Hunter-Douglas, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 157.
281 See Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 645.
282 Pub. L. No. 100as not constituting patent misuse is consistent with the current caselaw and makes sense as a matter
276
277
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(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty
of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done
one or more of the following: . . . .
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the
license or sale is conditioned.
Subcomponent (4) was not controversial as it was viewed as stating established
law.283
The fact that a patentee has the power to
refuse a license does not mean that he has the power to grant a license on such
284

Subcomponent 5 is

-ins refer to unpatented
products, staple products used in the operation of the patented product. 285 For those
products, no tie-in can exist without a showing of market power in the tying product,
doing away with an earlier presumption that the existence of a patent presumed the
presence of market power.286 The component does give the patent holder some
authority over the marketing of non-staple goods with no non-infringing uses beyond
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) effectively confer upon the
patentee, as a lawful adjunct of his patent rights, a limited power to exclude others
from competition in nonstaple goods. A patentee may sell a nonstaple article himself
287

271(c).288

35 U.S.C. §
35
U.S.C.S. § 271(c) identifies the basic dividing line between contributory infringement
and patent misuse. It adopts a restrictive definition of contributory infringement that
distinguishes between staple and non-staple articles of commerce. It also defines the
class of non-staple items narrowly. In essence, this provision places staple materials
outside the scope of the contributory infringement doctrine. As a result, it is no longer
necessary to resort to the doctrine of patent misuse in order to deny patentees control
289
over staple goods used i
Rep. Kastenmeier quoted in Cong. Rec. at H 10648 (Oct. 20, 1988)
See Transparent-Wrap, 329 U.S. at 643.
285 See supra Section IV.C.
286 See U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing
of Intellectual Property
283
284

See Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. at 203.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or
a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
287
288

289

See Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S.at 200.
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patentee may make and sell non-staple goods used in conjunction with his
290

However, in dissent, Justice White (joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens)
does not define conduct that constitutes patent misuse;
291 More broadly,
market power on the patente 292 Determinations of antitrust violations, as well as
patent misuse, must then involve Rule of Reason analysis.
D. Section Conclusions
At the risk of some undue simplification, the following broad conclusions can be
drawn from the preceding case law review.
Repair/Reconstruction: The case law is clear that repair is allowable,
shorter-lived non-patented component is the relevant one, than that is characteristic
of repair, not reconstruction.
Patent Exhaustion: Unless and until the Supreme Court decides otherwise,
patentees have a wide latitude in specifying post-sale limitations for conditional sales.
This restriction must be reasonable within the patent grant; that is, relates to the
subject matter of the patent claims. The latitude is exhausted if the restriction is
otherwise illegal, such as a per se violation of the antitrust laws. But that is only a
necessary, not a sufficient condition. Sufficiency requires a showing of market power
by the patentee in the relevant market, beyond the mere presence of a patent. That
is, patent exhaustion cases are assessed on a Rule of Reason basis.
Implied License: The presence of an implied license must be plainly indicated,
often from an entire course of conduct. For an implied license to exist there must be
no non-infringing alternative use.
Patent Misuse: Patent exhaustion and patent misuse are separate and distinct.
An antitrust violation would typically establish patent misuse, but misuse can exist
short, in the sense of the need to prove an antitrust violation and individual harm, of
an antitrust violation. The patentee however must be shown to have market power in
the relevant market. The extension of limited control to related non-staple goods does
not constitute patent misuse.
Critical to the assessment infra
and particularly antitrust treatment of aspects like substantial harm and the tradeoff
for legitimate business practices, considering the

See id. at 203.
See Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S.at 234.
292 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 39 (2006).
290
291
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V. ASSESSMENT
This section applies the case law principals to the two test examples, rotary drill
bits and to
, case law reviews are examined prior to drawing
a
A. Rotary Drill Bits293
1. Repair v. Reconstruction
Quite clearly the re-facing of the used (but not consumed) bits is repair, not
reconstruction. This judgment is based on the relatively small portion of the bit which
is affected, the drill face and not the bearings, which constitute the majority of the
294).
2. Patent Exhaustion/Implied License
Hughes provided no implied license a
...
stamped on each bit. This determination directly follows the decision from Met-Cal
Systems.295
Following Mallinckrodt296 and Quanta297 and reiterated in Lexmark298 there is no
per se bar to a conditional restriction of the use of the drill bits through the lease
the lease compared to a full price for full ownership (although the typically worn out
bits would have limited use value once extracted from the well). Thus, the lease
arrangement is legal, unless that is[delete] there is an antitrust violation, which would
render the Hughes patents unenforceable. Most common infractions are price fixing
not a matter for Hughes as it leased directly to drillers through its field teams and
tying. Tying is also not an issue because the drill bit licenses were not linked with any
other products.
Monopolization (Section 2 of the Sherman Act) is a possible violation. Certainly
with an estimated 75 percent market share with no technologically close competitors
Hughes had the requisite market power to control the rotary drill market. 299 The
market share and from it the market power though was based upon product
superiority with patented technologies. Finding a Section 2 violation would require a
showing that the intent of the leasing program was specifically to limit competition
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section IV.A.
295 Met-Cal Systems, 803 F.2d at 687. See also supra Section IV.B.
296 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d. 700.
297 See Quanta, 553 U.S. 617.
298 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d. 721.
299 See Hughes, 114 Supp. at 546.
293
294
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from re-tippers. From HunterAttempted monopolization differs from
monopolization in that a claimant must show (1) anticompetitive or predatory
behavior, (2) a dangerous probability of success, and (3) a specific intent to monopolize.
Thus, in order to establish either monopolization or attempted monopolization, the
alleged monopolizer must have engaged in some exclusionary or anticompetitive
300
behav
Countervailing evidence was the report that the lease agreements were needed
for collecting the used bits for examination as a critical input into product
improvement, a legitimate business purpose. Sherman 2 cases present a high bar,
particularly when, like here, the market share is largely based on product superiority,
there is no indication of conspiracy, and the behavior in question does fulfill a
legitimate purpose. Hence, in the absence of additional evidence of an antitrust
violation, the Hughes patent rights can be said not to have been exhausted through
the leasing process.
3. Patent Misuse
A showing of patent misuse requires a determination that the patent scope be
impermissibly broadened. Often that broadening involves a mandated connection with
a non-patented product, either staple or non-staple. That tying arrangement is not at
issue with the drill bits under study here. They are stand-alone.
What a determination of patent misuse does not require is the proving of
anticompetitive effects or individual harm, all together a lesser burden of proof than
an antitrust claim under the Sherman or Clayton Act. Does the Hughes leasing
requirement meet this standard?
For a Sherman Section 2 monopolization charge the significant market share of
Hughes Tool Co. does raise the question if Hughes is not using its market power to
squelch competition from re-tippers. District court testimony that Hughes focused its
enforcement efforts on small re-tippers, who presumably were less able to resist than
the larger firms,301 is consistent with the squelching hypothesis. Similarly, some
drillers testimony that the worn bits had little utility and could be collected by the
Hughes field men even without a lease agreement 302 is consistent with a coercion
hypothesis. Counterbalancing those positions is the clear legitimate business purpose
of collecting and examining the warn bits, so again this line of inquiry is indeterminate.
A final avenue of exploration is evaluating how the lease requirement might be
assessed under Section 5 of the FTC Act. That Section has two components, the
business oriented unfair methods of competition and consumer-oriented unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.303 Of these, the unfair methods of competition better apply
to the Hughes drill bit leasing policy. Section 5 cases are Sherman and Clayton-like
without the degree of proof required, including acting when a conduct is in its
incipiency prior to maturing into a full violation. In this instance, a court examining
See Hunter-Douglas, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
See Ford, 114 F. Supp. at 550.
302 See Hughes,
300
301

303

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).

[16:411 2017] The Courts Interpretations of Legitimate Business Purposes ,
with Applications to Lexmark

447

an infringement suit could determine if Section 5 was violated which, being an
antitrust statute, would render the underlying patent(s) unenforceable. 304
In making such a judgment a court would have significant latitude in interpreting
the application of Section 5 to an infringement proceeding. But, on threat of reversal
by a higher court, it presumably would be held to similar standards of the FTC. From
Du Pont305:
In our view, before business conduct in an oligopolistic industry may be
labelled unfair within the meaning of § 5 a minimum standard demands
that, absent a tacit agreement, at least some indicia of oppressiveness must
exist such as (1) evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose on the part of
the producer charged, or (2) the absence of an independent
legitimate business reason for its conduct. If, for instance, a seller's conduct,
even absent identical behavior on the part of its competitors, is contrary to
its independent self-interest, that circumstance would indicate that the
business practice is unfair within the meaning of § 5. In short, in the
absence of proof of a violation of the antitrust laws or evidence of collusive,
coercive, predatory, or exclusionary conduct, business practices are not
unfair in violation of § 5 unless those practices either have an
anticompetitive purpose or cannot be supported by an independent legitimate
reason.
As noted, with Hughes there is no indication of collusive, exclusionary, etc.
price increases,306 but that does not necessarily imply collusive behavior. There is a
legitimate business reason for the leasing practice by Hughes, but the underlying issue
is if the real motivation is anticompetitive, in this instance, the exclusion of
competition from re-tippers. Whatever the intent, the result of the lease-only policy
-tipping]
307

The task required for condemning the lease-only policy though is separating the
consequence from the intent. The district court collected considerable testimony from
current and past Hughes employees to the effect that the intent supported limiting
competition, and the marketing staff devised the plan, not the engineering/product
development department.308 Testimony further emphasized that the bits of interest, a
small percent of Hughes sales,309 were designed for and used in softer rock formations.
Bearings from those bits survived, allowing re-tipping, whereas those used in hard

See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493. See also supra Section IV.C.
See Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 139-40.
306 See Hughes,
304
305

307
308

lease ag
309

See Hughes, 114 F. Supp. at n. 78.
See id.
See id.

es changes the prices of
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rock applications typically were destroyed by use, meaning that re-tipping was not at
issue. Hughes had a smaller market share for bits for soft rock formations. 310
Enforcement of the lease-only policy was far stronger in hard-rock areas (3% retipped) than in the soft (up to 35-40% re-tipped). In part the differential is attributable
to drilling characteristics as it affects the integrity of dulled bits, 311 as well as greater
competition in the soft rock areas were Hughes did not have the superior technology,
but if the lease policy predicated on product improvement, one would anticipate similar
enforcement levels.312 This interpretation is strengthened by testimony that Hughes
pursued only the small re-tippers, not their large oil company customers,313 although
presumably the engineering information which could be developed from an
examination of the used bits would be similar for both groups of users. That is, there
is a strong indication that sales and competition considerations in areas dominated by
Hughes products prevail over product development and customer service. The cost
consequence for drillers was notable. One operator estimated that the use of re-tipped
314

If, as appears to be the case, the lease arrangement was intended to suppress
competition and Hughes was enjoined from continuing, how then might it proceed,
particularly as regards access to worn bits for product improvement purposes? One
approach would be to examine the bits once completely worn out and worthless,
whether that be following the initial or subsequent use. Likely the technical
information would not be as evident for the re-tipped bits, but some information would
be available. Alternatively, or additionally, it could purchase the used bits identified
by the field men as notable, or simply purchase a random sample for examination.
purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of
315

B. Toner Cartridges316
1. Repair v. Reconstruction
The toner ink is the less permanent component of an ink cartridge and, following
Arlo Mfg. Co.,317 its replacement is a repair, not a reconstruction. Indeed, Lexmark
never charged any of its multiple alleged infringers with illegal reconstruction.

310 See Hughes,
bits, especially those designed for drilling in softer for
311 See Hughes, 114 F. Supp. at 550-51.
312 See id.
313 See id.
314 See id. at n. 4 (the use of re-tipped bits saved about $ 30,000 over total annual bit costs of $
200,000)
315 See Static Control Components, 615 F.Supp. 2d at 581 (Citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
316 See supra Section III.B.
317 See Arlo Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 366 (1961).
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2. Patent Exhaustion/Implied License
Many of the past patent exhaustion cases apply to extensions of the patent
monopoly to unpatented components, be they staples or noncartridges though are patented in their own right rendering that case law nonapplicable.318 Nonetheless, the case law indicates no per se restriction over post-sale
use limitations for patented products, as was recently re-iterated in Lexmark.319 There
was no testimony to the effect that consumers were from the box label not aware of the
use limitations and compensated, in the form of a 20 percent discount from the
unrestricted use cartridges.320 The existence of the box labels similarly does away with
the potential for an implied license.321
As with the rotary drill bit case,322 relief for an infringer then requires a showing
of an antitrust violation. Specifically, that violation would need to be a Sherman Act
Section 2 (monopolization) charge, as there is no suggestion of price fixing or tying.
States, which is typically related to its market share. One measure of market share
for printer cartridges is a comp
in 2010 that was just seven percent323 in a declining market with HP continuing to
hold the dominant position with a share in the low 40s. 324 By this measure. Lexmark
is not a dominant player and the printer market appears to be generally competitive.
There is another way to measure printer cartridge market share, and that is the
share of replacements sold for a particular brand/model of printer. According to one
study:325
Survey evidence shows that consumers have little knowledge of replacement
ink prices when they purchase printers. As a result, they become locked in to
particular aftermarkets. Only competition in those aftermarkets can
discipline price competition in the printer market is not effective to restrain
aftermarket ink prices. Consequently, printer makers have unambiguous
incentives to exclude rivals from the replacement ink aftermarkets. Methods
for exclusion include the assertion of questionable design patents and the
modification of products without corresponding consumer benefits. At

See supra Section III.A.
See Lexmark, 816 F.3d. 721.
320 See supra Section III.B.
321 See supra Section IV.B.
322 See supra Section V.A.
323 Larry Dignan, HP grabs printer market share. Between the Lines, Sept. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.zdnet.com/article/hp-grabs-printer-market-share/. Last visited 8/29/16.
324 Anne Shields,
, MARKET REALIST, Sept. 24,
2015, available at http://marketrealist.com/2015/09/hps-revenue-growth-continues-flag-3q15/. Last
visited 8/29/16.
325 Robert E. Hall, The Inkjet Aftermarket: An Economic Analysis, NU-KOTE INTERNATIONAL AND
STANFORD
UNIV.
Aug.
8,
1997.
Available
at
http://web.stanford.edu/~rehall/Inkjet%20Aftermarket%201997.pdf. Last visited 8/29/16. The study
focused specifically on ink jet cartridges while the Lexmark cases are for laser printers, but there is
no reason to believe the two cartridge markets perform differently.
318
319
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present, printer makers enjoy high market shares in their own after-markets
The industry figured out years ago that once people buy
a printer they are committed to it, so you can sell the printer at or below cost knowing
they will buy the cartridges. 326 Everyone complains about the price of ink, but
consumers do not do a net-present-value analysis when shopping -- we only do it with
327
higher328 which of course is not illegal,
particularly if there is a legitimate business purpose for the behavior. Recall that
Lexmark critiqued poorly performing third-party refilled cartridges as damaging the
product reputation and hurting sales.329 For those wishing to avoid the use restrictions
contradiction. If (illegally) third-infringing? Moreover, the
geographical targeting of cartridges prevents a cartridge bought in Europe from
working in a model made for North America, preventing the use of illegally imported
330 Conversely of course, a North American customer who took
his/her printer to Europe for use would quickly find the replacement cartridges
available there would not function. Would not such malfunctions be blamed on
Lexmark as well, as indeed it is a designedViewed from this perspective, the reputation-protection justification for the
cartridge use restriction sounds more like an excuse than a legitimate business
justification. Still, it would be difficult to present a firm with an underlying single
digit market share in printers as a monopolist in the Sherman Act sense.
3. Patent Misuse
Consider possible patent misuse, with its lower level of proof required, and within
it the potential for an FTC Act Section 5 violation, with emphasis on unfair business
practices.331 According to court interpretations, Section 5 is not violated short
anticompetitive purpose or cannot be supported by an independent legitimate
332

of the Lexmark reputation, and subsequent printer sales, in the face of independent,
low quality re-fillers. What there is not is a clear legitimate business reason for is the

326 Quoted in Lamont Wood, Printer ink: Tired of feeding the cash cow?, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar.
28, 2012, available at http://www.computerworld.com/article/2503134/computer-hardware/printerink--tired-of-feeding-the-cash-cow-.html. Last visited 8/31/16.
327 See id.
328 See supra Section II.
329 See supra Section III.B.
330 See id.
331 See supra Section IV.C.
332 See Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 139-40; see also supra Section V.A.
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further leads to a suspicion the ban is for suppressing competition. 333 Facilitating the
recycling of empty cartridges is another possible legitimate business justification.
Hewlett Packard, among other cartridge manufacturers, emphasizes the degree of
recycling carried out at its specialized facility made possible by returning cartridges to
334

Of course, centralized recycling is typically less efficient than re-use or local
community recycling, which is increasingly available, and any recycling less efficient
than re-use. Indeed, in 2009 as part of a recycling act the EU banned chips which
prevent consumers from refilling cartridges. 335 While the business purposes for the
consequences are all too evident, the suppression of competition.
consumer protection-o
Section 5.336
It can be argued that consumers are being misled on their
printer/cartridge purchases in two regards, one being an overstatement of performance
problems with third-party refilled cartridges. An article identifies possible printer
damage, cartridge failure, and low quality ink as possible problems with using third
party cartridges.337
These are difficult charges to refute short of a systematic sampling and testing,
not easily done. PC World working with the staff from the Rochester Institute of
Technology did though undertake one such systematic test. The basic finding
concluded
-party inks in our test group yielded more prints per
cartridge--on top of costing less--but that, with some notable exceptions, the printer
manufacturers' ink we evaluated usually produced better-quality prints and proved
338 Evidently, the low-cost benefits of discount cartridges are
not complete as there are some quality differences, at least for the tested products. But
the differences are ones consumers can readily observe and evaluate for themselves.
More generally, according to a selfrumors about head-clogging attributed to clone ink are planted in the forums to confuse
people trying to do research on the Internet. You simply cannot find an honest

333

compatible cartridge suppliers. For example, they may design their toner cartridges or printers with
patented parts so that a compatible would be difficult to manufacture without violating the patents
Hardboiled
Available at https://blog.neweggbusiness.com/buying-guides/cheap-toner-compatible-versus-oemtoner-cartridges/. Last visited 8/31/16.
334 Quoted in Matthew Murray,
course), EXTREMETECH, Apr. 24, 2012, available at http://www.extremetech.com/computing/126821should-you-refill-your-printers-ink-cartridges-hp-says-no-of-course/2. Last visited 8/30/16.
335 Matthew Humphries,
GEEK, Dec. 23, 2002,
available at http://www.geek.com/chips/eu-bans-clever-chips-in-printer-cartridges-547917/. Last
visited 8/30/16.
336 Ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
337 Ashley Poland, Disadvantages to Refill Cartridges, SMALL BUSINESS UNDATED, available at
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/disadvantages-refill-cartridges-64849.html. Last visited 8/30/16.
338 PCWorld
Available at
http://www.pcworld.com/article/147267/ThirdPartyInk.html. Last visited 8/30/16.
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Thus there is reason to believe that printer manufactures overstate the
problems with refilled cartridges for their benefit, thereby misleading consumers.
339

marketing model. The model is certainly not illegal per se, but its success does depend
on consumers weighing the (low) initial cost more heavily than the (high) ongoing cost,
or ignoring future costs altogether. That is their right, but additional information
provided at the time of purchase would help mitigate that short term financial
perspective. For example, if the posted printer purchase price includes a per-page ink
cost for both manufacturer cartridges and a representative third-party product,
consumers could make a more informed decision. As an example of required full cost
reporting, legislation now mandates a reporting of all fees for a leased vehicle, 340
although admittedly that is a far larger and more complex financial arrangement than
for a computer printer.
Overall as regards the consumer protection aspects of Section 5, the application
printer cartridges has a material effect on consumers.
Manufacturer cartridges cost 50 percent and above over those provided by third
parties.341 In a market with North American annual sales of $ 23.7 billion 342 that is a
significant cost. However, while marketers may take advantage of a limitation of many
consumers who do not evaluate lifetime costs, there is minimal evidence beyond the
mislead consumers. Sellers more likely exclude useful information rather than provide
it in a misleading way. And of course, with a little arithmetic, consumers can avoid
being enticed by the razor blade model. Thus, there is little evidence for the violation
of the consumer protection component of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
C. Section Conclusions
From the preceding I conclude that, while the evidence of the Hughes Tool Co.
lease-only policy falls short of an apparent antitrust violation, I do conclude it is liable
for patent misuse based on the lower evidence standard for a FTC Section 5 violation,
as interpretable by an infringement court. The marketing of drill bits being integral
products does not involve a razor blade marketing approach, but the consumer loss
attributable to the leasing policy nonetheless was potentially significant.
The situation with the Lexmark printer cartridges is different in that the company
very much, along with the rest of the industry, gives every evidence of following the
339 John C. Dvorak, The Secret Printer Companies Are Keeping From You, PC WORLD, Sept. 6,
2012, available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2409373,00.asp. Last visited 8/30/16.
340 Consumer Leasing Act. 15 USC 1667 et seq. Syn
Available at https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0056-understanding-vehiclefinancing#federal. Last visited 8/30/16.
341 Castleink.
Available at
http://www.castleink.com/category/203/Buying-Brand-Name-vs.-Compatible-Ink-Cartridges.html.
Last visited 8/31/16.
342 Statista
available at
http://www.statista.com/statistics/204470/printer-cartridge-revenue-in-north-america-since-2007/.
Last visited 8/31/16.
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is nothing illegal about that approach, but it
does require that firms strive diligently to limit competition from re-fillers. The
restricted use Return Program cartridges followed by the ongoing infringement
litigation are in line with that effort. Is it though illegal? Arguably it does not rise to
the level of a Sherman or Clayton Act violation and hence does not fit patent
exhaustion under recent interpretations by the courts. The explicit licensing
agreement of those Return Program cartridges certainly voids any implied license.
What does appear to be triggered is patent misuse under the weaker standards of
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the third major form of antitrust legislation, along with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Implicated is the unfair methods of competition aspect,
not the consumer protection component, even if there is reason to believe
manufacturers overstate the perils of using refilled cartridges.
A patent misuse decision by the courts would render the underlying patents
unenforceable, terminating the infringement suits. Re-fillers of Lexmark (and other
costs for consumers. Lexmark and other printer manufacturing companies could use
contract violation to prevent refilling, but not infringement actions. And they could
continue to present, with some justification, their genuine products as superior, but
consumers would have an option.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Specific conclusions regarding the two case studies examined here, for rotary drill
bits and computer printer cartridges, are straightforward. Recent decisions on patent
exhaustion which allow broad exceptions for conditional sales restrictive licenses
place those two case examples outside exhaustion save for an antitrust violation. Both
of the case examples have the requisite market power to trigger antitrust concerns,
Hughes Tool Co. in absolute market share with limited technical competition, and
Lexmark because standard restrictive practices such as a patented cartridge design
mean that owners of Lexmark printers are limited to Lexmark-styled cartridges. But
with no conspiracy or meeting of the minds alleged and no tying, monopolization
remains the principal option among the major antitrust acts. Monopolization though
presents a high bar.
Where my conclusions differ from those of the courts is in the lack of attention to
potential patent misuse. Patent misuse is the unwarranted extension of the patent
monopoly, frequently evidenced by a nearsignificant for the level of proof required for patent misuse is lower than that for
antitrust. And when Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 343 is included
among the forms of antitrust legislation to be considered, something the courts have
not done in infringement cases, the bar is further lowered, Section 5 can be applied to
behavior in its incipiency without the requirement to show individual harm. Section
5 cases are typically resolved by the FTC with cease-and-desist agreements, but when
applied by the courts to patent misuse cases there is no reason other remedies cannot
be applied.

343

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
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Here I propose that, under a Section 5 assessment, both Hughes Tool Co. and
Lexmark are guilty of patent misuse, which renders their patents unenforceable,
terminating the infringement cases. As justification I argue the restrictive sales
agreements used by both were done with a primary anticompetitive intent of limiting
competition from refurbished products.
legitimate business justification for the restrictive sales terms was either inconsistent
with the evidence, or stronger than required to achieve the stated objective. In short,
the restrictions are anticompetitive, in the case of Lexmark allowing the
costs for consumers.
Those are my specific conclusions. More generally I argue that the courts, and
the appeals courts in particular in the two model cases examined here, set too low a
when a legitimate business purpose is identified, without considering whether that
stated purpose reflects the true intent of the sales restrictions.
Consider an example when the courts have been more probing in their appraisal
of a series of voter ID laws enacted in six states. 344 State legislators justified the laws
by citing the prevention of voter fraud, which would entail misrepresenting identity
for those not eligible to vote (such as non-citizens) or possible multiple voting. An
example is the North Carolina General Assembly which on July 23, 2013 adopted HB
Every qualified voter voting in person in accordance with
this Article, G.S. 163-227.2, or G.S. 163The bill does not specify the justification for the requirement beyond what can be
An Act to restore confidence in government by establishing
the voter information verification act to promote the electoral process through
education and increased registration of voters and by requiring voters to provide photo
identification before voting to protect the right of each registered voter to cast a secure
vote with reasonable security measures that confirm voter identity as accurately as
345 As a further
possible without restriction, and
connection, the 2016 Republican Party platform the North Carolina law was passed
73 to 41 exclusively by Republican lawmakers 346 - supports voter ID requirements
erned, however, that some voting procedures
may be open to abuse. For this reason, we support legislation to require proof of
347

During a preliminary case challenging the North Carolina legislation Judge
Schroeder noted, regarding the pre-HB 589 procedures in place
oll workers did not
344

Available
at
https://www.aclu.org/map/voter-suppression-laws-whats-new-2012presidential-election. Last visited 9/6/16 (an additional 11 having legislation limiting voting access by
establishing additional registration mandates and/or curtailing polling place availability).
345 North Carolina General Assembly HB 589 Part 2(e) (emphasis added).
346

Washington
Post
Sept.
2,
2016
at
6.
Available
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/inside-the-republican-creation-of-the-northcarolina-voting-bill-dubbed-the-monster-law/2016/09/01/79162398-6adf-11e6-8225fbb8a6fc65bc_story.html. Last visited 9/8/16.
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have access to the signatures [of registrants], either during early voting or on Election
Day. Accordingly, signatures were not verified at the polling place and, unless the poll
worker knew the voter, the poll worker had very limited means of determining whether
the voter was the same person as the registrant. 348 This seemingly lax approach
suggests the potential for fraud. And indeed Judge Schroeder, following a detailed
North Carolina's voterID requirement, now with a reasonable impediment exception, serves legitimate State
349

The appeals court reached a sharply different conclusion by examining the likely
motivations for the law, using data and logic to reject the justification for photo ID as
a fraud-prevention measure.
enough to effectively prevent voter fraud; "[i]t is at once too narrow and too
-person
voting and not to absentee voting, is too narrow to combat fraud. On the one
hand, the State has failed to identify even a single individual who has ever
been charged with committing in-person voter fraud in North Carolina. On
the other, the General Assembly did have evidence of alleged cases of mail-in
absentee voter fraud.350
The photo ID requirement is also too broad, enacting seemingly irrational
restrictions unrelated to the goal of combating fraud. This overbreadth is
most stark in the General Assembly's decision to exclude as acceptable
identification all forms of state-issued ID disproportionately held by African
Americans. The State has offered little evidence justifying these exclusions.
Review of the record further undermines the contention that the exclusions
are tied to concerns of voter fraud. This is so because voters who lack
qualifying ID under SL 2013-381 may apply for a free voter card using two of
the very same forms of ID excluded by the law. Thus, forms of state-issued
IDs the General Assembly deemed insufficient to prove a voter's identity on
Election Day are sufficient if shown during a separate process to a separate
state official.351
It can be noted that independent evaluations of the prevalence of in-person voter
fraud found it to be infinitesimally small. News21 in an analysis of over 2,000 alleged
voter fraud cases nation-wide for example found only 10 involving impersonation.352
Having rejected the proffered justification for the stricter ID standards the
appeals court sought other reasons, and located them in the form of racial
348 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55712 (M.D.N.C., Apr. 25,
2016) at 18019.
349 Id. at 605 (citation omitted).
350 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13797, at *62, 63 (citing Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
351 See id. at 63-64 (citations omitted).
352
Comprehensive Database of U.S. Voter Fraud Uncovers No Evidence That Photo
ID Is
Available at http://votingrights.news21.com/article/election-fraud/. Last
visited 9/15/16.
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legislation] is their impact on African American voters. The record thus makes obvious
emerging support for the minority party. Identifying and restricting the ways African
Americans vote was an easy and effective way to do so. We therefore must conclude
353
that race constituted a butFollowing a similar logical process, the appeals court in Lexmark354 might have
questioned why Lexmark sold non-restricted cartridges which would allow refilling
when the stated justification of the Return Program use limitations included the
protection of the company reputation from improper re-fillers. If the proposed
justification, while seemingly a legitimate business purpose, is inconsistent with the
stated goal then a secondary explanation is needed. From Du Pont
,a
seller's conduct, even absent identical behavior on the part of its competitors, is
contrary to its independent self-interest, that circumstance would indicate that the
355
business practice is unfair within the meaning of §
356
In Lexmark that explanation is the anti-competitive intent, as with N.C. State
Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory it was voter suppression which in a discriminatory way
a particular race s access to the franchise because its members vote for a particular
357 Generally,
s actual non-racial motivations to determine
358
whether they alone can justify the legislature
What is proposed here then is the courts need to be more probing when evaluating
restrictive use requirements for patented products. Very likely some legitimate
business purpose is served, but is it the principal purpose? Recalling that the patent
monopoly concept is constructed on the basis of a carefully crafted balance between
public and private benefit, does the restriction balance public and private benefit, or is
the benefit greatly skewed to the patent owner and costs to consumers?
These are non-trivial economic decisions for the courts to make, although they can
be proxied by examining intent, not the economic consequences. In aggregate the
consequences extend beyond the particulars of an individual case to the continued
existence of patent exhaustion: if all that is required to avoid patent exhaustion is the
addition of a use condition on sale or lease, then that is what will happen. As stated
in dissent in Lexmark
g the patent holder to
impose conditions on the sale of a patented item would indeed largely eviscerate the
359 And a patent system absent patent exhaustion provides a
skewed public/private benefit division.

See id at 70-71.
See Lexmark, 816 F.3d. 721.
355 See Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 139-40. See also supra Section V.A.
356 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d. 721.
357 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13797, at *29.
358 See id. at 25.
359 See Lexmark, 816 F.3d at 780.
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